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In this paper we describe our experiences in using AcciMaps and 
the Risk Management (ActorMap) framework (RMF) to analyse 
two recent accidents – the infection outbreaks which occurred at 
the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust and the 2005 
Stockwell Shooting incident. We first review previous work using 
AcciMaps and the RMF, followed by an account of our goals and 
the procedure used to carry out the accident analyses and the 
differences in our use of the methods. Finally, we reflect on these 
differences in order to develop of a set of criteria which could be 
used to scope more detailed guidelines for the selection and use of 
the two methods. 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the years a large number of accident analysis techniques have been 
developed that recognise the importance of considering the environmental 
context and the role played by systemic failings at differing organisational levels. 
Some of these approaches are presented as frameworks or philosophies (e.g., 
Reason. 1990) while others are presented as methods (e.g., STAMP - Leveson, 
2010; the Risk Management Framework - Rasmussen, 1997; AcciMaps – 
Svedung and Rasmussen, 2000). These techniques have been used to analyse a 
wide variety of domains and accident scenarios. The prevalence of different 
methods, and the numerous interpretations of each is most likely a result of the 
complexity bound within these domains, but it can also prove to be a challenge 
to those seeking some form of ‘route map’ of the territory as it applies to the 
analysis of systemic failure. 
 
 
  
 
 
In this paper we consider the use of the methods originally developed by Jens 
Rasmussen – the Risk Management (ActorMap) Framework (RMF) and 
AcciMaps. The paper came about as the result of the authors using these 
techniques independently in order to analyse two very different domains 
(Healthcare and Policing). Our specific objectives are: (1) To compare and 
contrast examples of recent applications of the RMF and AcciMap techniques for 
accident analysis; (2) To consider the differences in applications of the RMF and 
AcciMap techniques in terms of any assumptions underlying their use (e.g., types 
of data, methodology, differing goals driving use of the techniques); (3) To 
systematise common features and differences in use of the techniques in order to 
provide a set of overarching criteria for selecting and using the methods for 
accident and disaster analysis. 
 
AcciMaps and the Risk Management (ActorMap) Framework 
 
AcciMaps is an accident analysis methodology that is used to represent 
graphically the causal factors involved in a particular accident or safety-
compromising incident, occurring within complex socio-technical systems. The 
approach also captures the preconditions and actions behind that causal chain of 
events. AcciMaps are diagrams developed to support vertical integration across 
the control levels of a socio-technical system. The AcciMap approach differs 
from typical accident analysis approaches in that, rather than identifying and 
apportioning blame, it is used to identify and represent the causal flow of events 
and the planning, management and regulatory bodies that may have contributed 
to the scenario, with a view to improving system design and safety (Svedung and 
Rasmussen, 2000). Rasmussen (1997) also developed a more general modeling 
framework (the Risk Management (ActorMap) Framework) for understanding 
the dynamic interaction between these types of components within a large-scale 
sociotechnical system. Table 1 summarises some of the studies which have made 
use of AcciMaps and the risk management framework. 
Table 1: Summary of studies using AcciMaps and the RMF 
Source Scope Characteristics of application 
Rasmussen (1997) RMF  Outline of RFM with components representing 
Government, regulators, company, management, 
staff, work context. 
Rasmussen & 
Svedung (2000) 
AcciMaps Government, regulators, company, management, 
staff, work context; detailed examples of 
AcciMaps. 
Vicente & 
Christofferen 
(2006) 
RMF and 
AcciMaps  
Mapping of contributory factors leading up to the 
outbreak using the RMF and AcciMaps 
Hopkins (2000) AcciMap Causal diagram of contributory factors leading up 
to accident using AcciMaps 
Salmon et al. 
(2010) 
RMF and 
AcciMaps 
Comparison of AcciMap and RMF models with 
Root Cause Model for led outdoor activity domain 
   
 
 
  
Case studies 
 
Both case studies have been described in detail in earlier papers presented at the 
Ergonomics Society Annual Conference in 2009, alongside separate papers 
published in the journal Ergonomics in 2009 and 2010 (Waterson, 2009; Jenkins 
et al., 2010). For this reason, we focus here on the application of the RMF and 
AcciMaps rather than provide a detailed account of the background or details of 
the incidents which were the subject of analysis. 
 
 
The C. difficile outbreaks within the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS 
Trust 
During the period between April 2004 and September 2006 an estimated 90 people 
died at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust as a result of becoming 
infected with the Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) bacteria (HC, [5, p.5]). The 
Healthcare Commission report identified a number of factors that contributed to 
the outbreaks that occurred with the Trust. These can be summarised in terms of 
five main themes: the role played by external organisations; management of the 
trust; clinical management on the hospital wards; the role played by the infection 
control team; and,  equipment and hygiene factors. Figure 1 depicts some of these 
contributory factors using the Risk Management Framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Applying the RMF to the infection outbreaks (Waterson, 2009) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The Stockwell shooting incident 
The Stockwell shooting incident which took place in late July 2005 followed on 
from a set of earlier terrorist bombings in London.  Figure 2 shows part of a 
larger AcciMap which was developed using reports written by the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission and the Metropolitan Police Authority. The 
events within the AcciMap are coded according to when they occurred (e.g., pre-
operation, pre-JCdM(Jean Charles de Menezes) leaving the flat). Figure 2 is 
made up of six levels; each of these levels involved various failures which 
ultimately led up to the shooting. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example AcciMap applied to Stockwell shooting incident 
 
 
Comparing our use of AcciMaps and the Risk Management 
Framework 
 
Our use of the RMF and AcciMaps showed some clear similarities and 
differences both in terms of the procedure which was used to carry out the 
analysis and the conclusions that were drawn regarding the causes of the 
accidents and incidents. Table 2 compares our use of the methods as they relate 
to our goals, intentions of use and procedure. 
 
The clearest differences in the use of the methods relates to the goals and 
intentions behind the analysis of the two accidents. In the case of the Stockwell 
shooting, one of the goals was to capture the dynamic nature of communication 
and decision-making as it took place over a short period of time. Much of the 
data which formed the AcciMap was directly taken from the various reports  
  
written about Stockwell. This is especially the case at lower levels of the 
AcciMap (i.e., levels 1-3). By contrast, the Infection case study was motivated 
by the need to explore a set of more loosely defined factors that could be linked 
together to explain the recurrence of the outbreaks. Part of the intention was to 
go beyond some the dominant explanations of infection outbreaks (e.g., 
compliance to hygiene protocols) and seek explanations from the findings 
relating to similar organisational issues within accident research. Accordingly, 
the infection case study tended to identify explanations at higher levels of the 
RMF. Data covering the outbreaks was less detailed as compared to Stockwell 
and partly motivated the need to see explanations across levels of analysis. The 
timescale for the outbreaks was also much longer (2 years), as compared to the 
minute-by-minute unfolding of activities in the Stockwell shooting. 
 
Table 2: Summary of studies using AcciMaps and the RMF 
 AcciMaps (Jenkins et al., 2010) RMF  (Waterson, 
2009) 
Context of 
use 
Command and Control – Policing Anti-
Terrorism 
Healthcare – Hospital 
Acquired Infections 
Goals and 
intention of 
use 
Modelling of the events leading up to the 
shooting (e.g., capturing aspects of decision-
making, communication, use of equipment and 
physical resources) 
Use of the systems 
approach to analyse and 
explain causes of the 
outbreaks; to further 
understand causal 
linkages and 
dependencies across 
system levels 
Procedure 1. Description of events leading up to shooting: 
(i) Social network diagramming of actors and 
linkages; (ii) Chronology (timeline) of events; 
(iii) Summary of observation statements; (iv) 
Diagram of police office and witness locations; 
2. AcciMap analysis - Annotation of causal 
factors according to temporal aspects of the 
incident 
1. Systems description: 
(i) Timeline; (ii) 
Summary of 
contributory factors in 
HC (2007): 2. Systems 
analysis -use of the 
Risk Management 
(ActorMap) framework 
focusing on:(i) Cross-
level relationships 
related to previous 
findings in the 
literature; (ii) Whole 
system relationships 
related to previous 
findings in the 
literature. 
   
 
Aspects of our goals and intentions of use with the methods, as well as the nature 
of data and the domain in question shaped the procedure used in the accident 
analysis. In many ways our use of the methods appeared to be guided by implicit 
assumptions about their scope and suitability of their use for the two case studies. 
In the final section of the paper we focus on a set of criteria which could be used 
to judge the suitability, as well as scoping the procedural aspects, of the RMF 
and AcciMaps methods. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Implicit assumptions underlying use of the methods 
 
In using the RMF and AcciMaps we were struck by the large range of 
alternatives and options for configuring and reconfiguring the original 
components set out by Rasmussen in his original description of the RMF and 
AcciMaps methods. This flexibility led us to attempt to articulate a set of criteria 
which could help potential users to judge the suitability of one method, or type of 
procedure, against another. This type of ‘front end’ guidance contrasts with the 
type of support provide by Branford et al. (2009) which attempts to lay out a set 
of guidelines for building AcciMaps. 
 
An additional difference is that we focus not only the procedural aspects of 
systems analysis, but also on some of the conceptual choices and options which 
may be open to the analyst. Other methodologies for the analysis of complex 
work systems have benefited from the development of similar guidelines and 
considerations (e.g., Cognitive Work Analysis – Naikar et al., (2006). A final 
consideration is that the criteria are not intended to be prescriptive, rather, the 
intention is to support the flexible and sometimes exploratory nature of the two 
methods. 
 
Establishing the purpose of the analysis 
The most important step before beginning the analysis is to establish its purpose 
and overall goals. With the infection outbreak case study the intention was 
primarily to explore the interplay between the various causal factors leading up 
to the outbreaks. These factors unfolded over longer timescales as compared to 
Stockwell and what Turner called the ‘incubation period’ (Turner, 1978) for the 
outbreaks was much longer. These types of considerations shaped the choice of 
the method in this case (RMF), as compared to Stockwell where the dynamics of 
the shooting required a more distributed, ‘time-stamped’ representation within 
the AcciMap. 
 
Consideration of the role of causality, intentionality and the nature of 
system error in the analysis 
The distributed nature of error alongside the differences in time-scale within the 
two case studies also shaped the outcomes from the analysis. The RMF was also 
chosen because it facilitated consideration of cross-level causal  
connections and linkages between macro and micro elements of the overall 
system. Error in this context was difficult to pin down to specific individuals, 
instead it manifested itself as a set of shared attitudes which infiltrated the 
culture of the hospital and blocked organisational learning. Organisational error 
in this form was easier to conceptually explore using the RMF. With Stockwell 
by contrast, the AcciMap format was more suited to building a ‘causal map’ 
bringing together processes of decision-making and communication. 
 
Domain specific considerations 
The nature of the two domains and the structural properties of the systems and 
sub-systems within the case studies also played a role in shaping the choice of 
method. The infection outbreak involved a widely distributed and diverse set of 
organisations and actors. Coupling between the various actors within the overall 
system was often very loose. Within Stockwell the degree of coupling was 
similarly loose at upper levels of the AcciMap, but tighter within the lower 
levels. Consideration of issues of coupling between levels, as well as the  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
communication requirements of actors in the system, also shaped the choice of 
the methods. 
 
Data and information inputs to the analysis 
Our use of the two methods showed some procedural similarities. Both cases 
started out by carrying out what might be called ‘domain analysis’, that is, 
developing an understanding of the domain independent of the accident or 
disaster in question. This may involve reading accounts of similar accidents (e.g., 
other infection outbreaks, the report on the Kings Cross fire). Documentary 
inputs into the analysis can determine the nature of the method used. The RMF 
for example, was used for the Infection case study partly because information 
was unavailable regarding the specific actions of individuals (e.g., health care 
managers). Similar information on decision-making, communication was 
available for the Stockwell and was therefore more appropriate for analysis using 
AcciMaps. 
 
Constructing RMF and AcciMap representations 
The most extensive set of guidelines for using and constructing AcciMaps are 
available in Branford et al. (2009). These cover a set of prompts and questions to 
be used at levels within the AcciMap. These types of support for analysis can be 
very useful; however, there is also an additional need to build some form of 
wider options for choices which may be possible at each level. This is especially 
the case where the specific prompts or questions to bask at each level are 
dependent on characteristics of the domain or the nature of error in the system. 
Our experience of using the methods is that these guidelines could be extended 
to cover options for potential modifications to the methods (e.g., the use of multi-
level theory, decision-ladders). 
 
Reviewing and validating the analysis 
The issue of the reliability and validity of the AcciMaps and RMF methods has 
been raised by a number of authors (e.g., Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). Our 
experience is that in some cases, for example where the primary motivation for 
using the method is exploratory (e.g., in infection outbreaks case study), 
extensive validation may not be necessary. Branford (2007) found that these are 
difficult with AcciMaps and that there is a need to acknowledge the subjective 
nature of analysis. Her findings suggested that there is a need to capture the 
underlying process and rationale during AcciMap judgments and decisions. 
 
 
Future work 
 
The criteria outlined need further refinement and development. We hope to use 
some of the other examples of use of the RMF and AcciMaps as a basis with 
which to develop more detailed and extensive guidance regarding the 
possibilities for using, tailoring and configuring components of the methods. 
Similarly, a clear priority is that further work needs to be conducted on the 
provision of support in order to improve the reliability and validity of the two 
methods. Our current work involves a set of studies aimed at examining not only 
reliability, but also usability issues associated with the AcciMap method. This 
work involves examining how different configurations of the method (e.g., 
procedure, sue of different types of maps), as well as support for recording 
additional information (e.g., decision-rationale), impact on usage characteristics 
and outputs generated by AcciMap analysts.  
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